Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2025
Abstract
Federal law has mandated the use of outside auditors by public companies since 1934. For much of that time, the audit industry watched itself. It monitored audit quality and decided how to address auditor misconduct. In 2002, Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) to watch the auditors. The legislation designed a regulatory scheme that presumed audit performance could be improved through an open and cooperative relationship between the regulator and the regulated audit firm. Congress created accountability for the agency by mandating that it disclose its oversight activities to the public (an approach characterized as “right-to-know” or “democratic” transparency). This Article considers initiatives proposed by the PCAOB suggesting an approach of “regulatory” transparency, wherein it mandates that the regulated audit firms disclose information about their operations to the public. The Article considers whether an approach to auditor oversight that focuses on watching the watched audit firm furthers the PCAOB’s statutory goal of audit quality improvement. It expresses skepticism about the approach and offers alternatives, consistent with the concept of democratic transparency, which could drive audit quality more effectively.
Recommended Citation
Sarah Williams,
Should We Watch the Watcher or the Watched? The Transparency Debate in Auditor Regulation, 94
U. Cin. L. Rev.
110
(2025).
Available at: https://insight.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/fac_works/511