Big Business as Gun Control

Authors

David B. Kopel
George A. Mocsary
Bhav Ninder Singh

Abstract

Gun control increasingly bypasses direct legislative enactments by co-opting the commercial marketplace. Financial institutions and insurers often face regulatory pressures, frequently articulated through vague notions of “reputational risk,” to terminate or restrict services for lawful firearms businesses and advocacy groups. The debanking tactic, seen in initiatives such as Operation Choke Point, can deny essential financial products to firearm owners, merchants, and organizations, curtailing the practical exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Simultaneously, government agencies sometimes pursue warrantless data collection from bank records and merchant category codes, building profiles of lawful purchasers and eroding privacy and due-process norms.

Social media platforms compound these problems by removing or limiting firearms-related content under opaque or inconsistently applied standards. Although they occasionally frame their policies as safeguards against violence, enforcement often removes instruction, historical discussion, and other legitimate forms of speech. The censorship distorts public debate about firearms, stifling conversations on safety, training, and responsible ownership.

This Article describes the significant shift toward privatized gun control, in which government entities and large corporations converge to limit access to banking, insurance, and information platforms. The outcome is a new type of regulatory regime that can subvert constitutional checks, undermine lawful enterprise, and chill lawful speech. Curbing abuses requires a combination of targeted legislation, judicial oversight, and self-restraint by private institutions to ensure that neither lawful commerce nor individual liberty are sacrificed to hidden agendas.

Recommended Citation

David B. Kopel, George A. Mocsary & Bhav Ninder Singh, Big Business as Gun Control, 129 Dick. L. Rev. 851 (2025).
Available at: https://insight.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlr/vol129/iss3/3